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COMMENTS
STATUS OF THE SOCIAL GUEST: A NEW LOOK
INTRODUCTION

Persons who enter upon another's property have been classified as
either trespassers, licensees, or invitees. Accordingly, each class of
individuals has certain rights and privileges under the law; the trespasser has the least, the invitee has the most. Traditionally, and universally the courts have termed the social guest as a licensee.' More
attention has been given this individual in recent years, but little has
yet been done to ameliorate his position under the law. Injustices arising
from the position taken by the courts can only be overcome by a
discarding of the prevailing traditional views.
In determining the status of individuals coming upon another person's
premises, courts have applied various tests and developed different views.
What small shifts there have been in recent years have favored the
social guest, but his status has yet to reach that of an invitee.

THEt PosrrIoN As TAKEN BY THE CoURTs
The social guest may suffer injury through either the "active" or
"passive" negligence of his host, as well as through some willful or
wanton act. "Active" negligence arises out of activities carelessly
carried on by the host while the guest is in his presence. "Passive"
negligence refers to injuries arising out of defective conditions in the
host's premises. While an invitee has been afforded protection from all
of these types of negligent acts, courts have yet to give the social guest
protection from certain types of acts.
A few courts hold the narrow and unjust position that a host's only
duty is to refrain from injuring the, guest through willful or wanton
conduct 2 The distinction between "active" and 'passive" negligence is
1. Southcote v. Stanley, 1 Hurlst & N 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 19 ENG. RU. CAS. 60
(1856). In this case, the guest was injured by a defective glass door in the defendant's
inn. The defendant knew that the door was defective but he gave no warning to the
plaintiff prior to the injury. The court held that the defendant was under no liability
to his guest arising out of an ordinary defect in the condition of the premises.
2. Cochran v. Aberchrombie, 118 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1960); Robinson v. Leighton, 122

Me. 309, 119 Ad. 809 (1923); Garner v. Pacific Coast Coal Co, 100 P.2d 32 (Wash.
1940); Carrol v. Spencer, 204 Md. 387, 104 A.2d 628 (1954); Colbert v. Ricker, 314
Mass. 138, 49 N.E.2d 459 (1943); Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake County, Inc,
125 Mont. 460, 239 P.2d 740 (1952); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d

609 (1950).
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not recognized and the host is not held liable for injuries to the guest
arising out of these types of acts. The social guest is in much the same
position as a trespasser since his right is no more than mere sufferance
on the premises of his host.3
Most courts recognize the distinction between "active" and "passive"
negligence as well as willful or wanton conduct. 4 This view has placed
the social guest in the same position as an invitee as regards the "active"
negligence of the host, since the host must exercise ordinary care in
carrying out his activities if he knows, or should have reason to know,
that the guest is in his presence.r
The main distinction which remains between the social guest and the
invitee, with respect to the duty owed by the host, concerns the conditions of the premises. Though the trend in cases involving "active"
negligence of the host has progressed favorably for the social guest, this
is not the case with "passive" negligence. The host owes to the invitee
the duty of inspecting his premises for defects of which he might
reasonably have knowledge." In addition to inspection, the host must
also exercise reasonable care in making the premises safe for the purposes
of the invitation. This preparation may include either providing safety
measures in dangerous areas, or warning the invitee of the existence of
dangers which are not apparent or obvious. 7 On the other hand, the
3.Jones v. 20 N. Wacker Drive Building Corporation, 332 Ill.
App. 382, 75 N.E.2d
400 (1947).
4. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, (4th Cir. 1942) 131 F.2d 845; Oettinger v.
Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); Radio Cab v. Houser, 76 App. D.C. 35, 128
F.2d 604 (1942); Moore v. Ohio Oil Co, 24 11. App. 388 (1926); Roadman v. C. E. Johnson Motor Sales, 210 Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166 (1941); Babcock & W. Co. v. Nolton, 58
Nev. 133, 71 P.2d 1051 (1937); Paquet v. Barker, 250 App.-Div. 771, 293 N.Y.S. 983
(1937); Duna v. Bomberger, 213 N.C. 172, 195 SE. 364 (1938); Davis v. Tredwell, 347
Pa. 341, 32 A.2d 411 (1943); Yamauchi v. O'neill, 38 Cal.-App. 703, 102 P.2d 365 (1940);
Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 143 S.E.2d 827 (1965); Oettinger v. Stewart. 24 Cal.2d
133, 148 P.2d 19, 22 (1944), quoting from PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 456 (2d ed. 1955).
"... it is now generally held that in cases resulting from active conduct, as
distinguished from conditions of the premises, the landowner or possessor may
be liable for failure to exercise ordinary care towards a licensee whose presence
on the land is known to the owner or possessor." [emphasis added]
5. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); Bradshaw v. Minter, supra
note 4, RFsrAT E N (Second) ToRrs § 341 at 929 (1958). This section states that
"a possessor of land is subject to liability to licensees, whether business visitors or
gratuitous licensees, for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to carry on his
activities with reasonable care for their safety, unless the licensees know or from the
facts known to them, should know of the possessor's activities and of the risk involved
therein."
6. Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 425 (1950).
7. Pettyjohn & Sons v. Basham, 126 Va. 72, 100 S.E. 813 (1919). The court made the
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host owes no duty to make the premises safe for the visit of his guest.8
His only duty is to prevent defects which occur as a result of gross
negligence9 such as dangerous traps or spring guns.' 0 Even in these
cases, the host must have knowledge of the dangers involved before he
will be held liable." The host is under no duty to inspect his premises
prior to the arrival of his guest; therefore, he is under no incidental
duty to prepare a safe place for his guest.' 2
These duties of inspection and preparation of the premises are the
discriminating features between the status of the social guest and the
invitee. Without the assurance that the premises will be safe for the
visit, social intercourse in communal environments is denied the security
which should be required by law. To provide this protection the
courts must change their position on the law from that which they now
hold.
WHY THE COURTS HAVE TAKEN THIS POSITION

The traditional view which placed the social guest in his unfavorable
position was originally based upon the idea of the right of an individual
to enjoy his property without outside interference. 13 A stranger took
the premises as he found them and subjected himself to all the risks
which the host and his family assumed. 14 Prosser recognizes the old
cliche-that a person on the premises with merely a gratuitous invitation
could not "look a gift horse in the mouth." 15 Over the years the courts
have accepted this traditional view without question.
Two popular tests have been utilized in recent years to distinguish
the social guest from the invitee. These are the "economic-benefit"
test and the "invitation" test. The former relies on whether or not there
is a mutual advantage involved in the relationship between the host
and the individual on his premises.' The latter is based on the purpose
underlying the giving of the invitation.17
observation that the host owed a duty of prevision, preparation, and lookout to the
invitee. As to the licensee, the host only owed the duty to lookout for him.
8. McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wash.2d 864, 233 P.2d 852 (1951).
9. Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1954).

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Carbon v. Mackchil Realty Co, 296 N.Y. 154, 71 N.E2d 447 (1947).
Vogel v. Ekert, 22 NJ. Super. 220, 91 A.2d 633 (1952).
McNamara v. Hall, supra note 8.
Comment, 31 TrtiN. L. REv. 485 (1964).
Comeau v. Comeau, supra note 9; RETATEmr, ToRTS S 331 (1932).
Phossu, supra note 4, 5 77, at 445.
Restatement, Torts S 332 (1932).

17. Comment, supra note 13.
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The test which is most rigid and has least favored the social guest
is the economic-benefit test. Under this standard the purpose of the
visit must or might confer some economic benefit on the host.', Even
where he comes upon the premises by express invitation of the host,
the visitor will not be an invitee unless there is some mutuality of interest
between the parties." Although the guest might render minor services
for his host during the visit, the courts have not generally held this to
be sufficient consideration to make the guest an invitee. 2 The social
relationship rather than the services rendered is looked upon as the
dominant aspect of the visit.2 1 The courts seem to fear that deriving a
benefit from every type of invitation would destroy the social guest
distinction.2 2 It appears that the rendering of incidental services would
be the only means by which a social guest could qualify under the
economic-benefit tests as an invitee, yet few cases have bestowed this
23
status on him.
Although the position of the social guest may seem hopeless in light
24
of the economic-benefit test, many courts have declined to use it.
Prosser's dislike of the early Restatement25 view favoring the economicbenefit test has had its effect.2 He felt that the rendering of an
economic benefit was not the essential element in determining the
status of a visitor, but rather that the courts should look to the purposes
for which the premises are open, whether public or private, and whether
the visitor entered the premises under a reasonable assurance that the
premises have been made safe for his visit.27 This view has been accepted
18. Restatement, supra note 14.
19. Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834 (1934); Comeau v. Comeau,
supra note 9.
20. Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 45 A.2d 491 (1946); Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C.
194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965).
21. Speece v. Brown, 40 Cal. Reptr. 384 (1964).
22. Cosgrave v. Malstrom, 127 N.J.L. 505, 23 A.2d 288 (1941).
23. Shepard v. Whigham, 141 SE.2d 583 (Ga. App. 1965), (here the guest was
injured while repairing a window fan for his host); McCulloch v. Horton, 102 Mont.
135, 56 P.2d 1344 (1936). In this case, the guest held a door open so that the host
could drive his truck out of his garage. The guest was injured when an unlatched
door on the host's truck struck him. The court stated that if the guest was not
a gratuitous employee, then he was at least an invitee.
24. Laube v. Stevenson, supra note 5; Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d
453 (1951).
25. Restatement, supra note 14.
26. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 Mixu. L. REv. 573 (1942).
27. id., at 611. Prosser's suggestions were:
(3) When premises are thrown to the public, the occupier assumes
responsibility for their safe condition toward any member of the public who
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in a modified form by the second Restatement.28
The invitation test is the most appropriate means for elevating the
social guest to the status of invitee, but most courts have been reluctant
to recognize it as such. The visitor is immediately termed a licensee
as a matter or law as soon as it is determined that he is a social guest.29
Prosser states that the customary reason is that the guest "understands
when he comes that he is to be placed on the same footing as one of
the family and must take the premises as the occupier himself uses
them, without any preparation." 30 Another reason is that a mere
social visit is not a sufficient purpose from which the social guest can
imply that the premises are in a safe conditionY' A third view is that the
social guest has only a license by permission,32 whereas the invitee usually
has a license by invitation.33 There is no reason why the courts could
not recognize that the social guest comes upon the premises with a
license by invitation and therefore deserves the same protection as an
invitee.3 4
Though the position of the courts has been to deny the social guest
the status of an invitee, the trend may soon change this position. The
courts now favor using the invitation test rather than the economicbenefit test.3 5 Greater utilization of this theory may cause the ascension
may enter for the purpose for which they are open, regardless of whether he
brings with him the hope of profit or "benefit?'.
(4) When premises are not open to ihe public, the individual may still be
entitled to protection if he enters under circumstances which give him reasonable assurance that care has been taken to make the place safe for his reception.
Visits for the performance of contracts, and for other economic advantage to the
occupier, usually are made upon such implied assurance..
28. RESTATElMENT, supra note 5, § 332. Invitee Defined:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the
public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land.
29. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. App. 1955); Compare, Laube v. Stevenson, supra note 5, J. Jennings dissent stating that the question is one of fact.
30. PaossaR, supra note 4, § 77 at 447.
31. Meyer v. Mitchell, 248 Minn. 397, 80 N.W.2d 450 (1957); Williams v. McSwain,
248 N.C. 13, 102 S.E.2d 464 (1958).
32. Milispaugh v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 104 Ind. App. 540, 12 N.E.2d.
396 (1938).
33. Ibid.
34. Alexander v. General Fire & Assurance Corporation, 98 So.2d 730 (La. App.
1957).
35. 2 Harper & James, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1480 (1956).
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of the social guest into the category of an invitee under the law. In
the words of Prosser,
The Restatement notwithstanding, the second [the 'invitation'] theory
is now accepted by the great majority of the courts, and many visitors
from whose presence no shadow of pecuniary benefit is to be found
are held to be invitees.3 6
WHY THE SociAL

Gussr SHOULD BE AN INVITEE

Louisiana is the only state which has actually taken the position that
the social guest is an invitee. In the case of Alexander v. General Fire &
Accident Assurance Corporation,37 the plaintiff, a social guest in the
defendant's home, was allowed to recover damages from an injury
sustained as a result of the defendant's passive negligence. The plaintiff
slipped on a loose rug in a narrow hallway between the living room and
the bathroom. The court said that the plaintiff was an invitee to whom
the duty owed by the host was
...not to insure him against the possibility of accident, but to exercise
reasonable or ordinary care for his safety commensurate with the
38
particular circumstances involved.
This court condemned the traditional view that the social guest was a
licensee as a matter of law because that view was based solely upon
earlier concepts of the peculiar sanctity of land. The court felt that this
view was both unrealistic and rigid in respect of the social guest-host
relationship, saying. that others have accepted this view "without
sufficient realistic inquiry into whether the conduct under the particular circumstances involved an unnecessary risk to the safety of others
avoidable by the exercise of due care." 29
Other jurisdictions have voiced dissension over the classification of a
social guest as a licensee but have yet to elevate him to the status of an
invitee. 40 Though an Ohio court said that the social guest lay somewhere between the status of an invitee and a licensee, dicta implied
that the social guest might be an invitee. 41 The h6st was not held to be
36. Possm, supra note 4, § 78 at 455.

37. Supra note 34.
38. Id. at 732.
39. Id.at 733.
40. Laube v. Stevenson, supra note 5; Scheibel v. Lipton, supra note 24; Guilford v.
Yale, 23 A,2d 917 (Mass. 1942).
41. Scheibel v. Lipton, supra note 24, at 463. The court stated "Although the host
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an insurer of his guest's safety, but he was under a duty to exercise
ordinary care both as to his active and passive negligence.
The law of negligence operates to shift the burden of responsibility
upon the wrongdoer. Its purpose is to serve justice commensurate with
the particular circumstances involved. The flexibility with which this
law may be applied is the means by which just results may be found,
and classifying the social guest as a licensee as a matter of law does not
follow this concept of flexibility. Applying principles of negligence, the
question involved is the standard of care the host owes to his guest. 42
It is more reasonable to judge the standard of care according to the
facts arising out of the social guest-host relationship without first
classifying the guest as a licensee as a matter of law.
The ease with which a homeowner can obtain liability insurance
is one of the important reasons for discarding archaic concepts underlying the host's immunity.4 The cost of insurance coverage is a small
burden on the host compared to the costly injury which may result
from his negligence. This fact refutes the argument that since both
the host and guest are on the same economic level the burden should
not be shifted to the host." The basic problem is that the courts do not
recognize insurance as a relevant issue in negligence cases. Insurance
is considered a collateral matter which, when offered into evidence, is
considered irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. A more liberal view
is that this type of evidence, if admitted, is not necessarily prejudicial
error.45 The Louisiana courts allow the insurance companies to be parties
defendant in cases involving injury to social guests. 46 All jurisdictions
should accept this practice in order that the burden of responsibility
should fall upon the negligent party. Fear of rising costs of insurance
premiums could be alleviated by some form of administrative control
much like automobile insurance commissions. To argue that this would
is not an insurer of the safety of the guest while on the premises of the host, some
duty short of that owed to a business visitor is owed to the guest. That duty of the
host ... is to exercise ordinary care not to cause injury to his guest by an act of the
host or by any activity carried on by the host while the guest is on the premises. Coupled with this is the duty to warn the guest of any condition of the premises known to
the host and which one of ordinary prudence and foresight in the position of the
host should reasonably consider dangerous, if the host has reason to believe that the
guest does not know and will not discover such dangerous conditions."
42. Comment, supranote 13.
43. Crittenden v. Fidelity & Casualty Co, 83 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1955).
44. 2 Harper & James, supra note 35.
45. Bradshaw v. Minter, supra note 4.
46. Supra note 34.
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cause a flood of litigation would be in derogation of sound principles
of justice, since, where the rights of an individual have been affected,
the law must correct the situation.
By no means is the host an insurer of the safety of his guest.4 7 To
inflict such a burden on an ordinary individual would be unjust in
itself. It is not intimated that the host should be held strictly liable, 48
but to require that ordinary care should be exercised by him when he
engages in social intercourse with another individual is fully reasonable.
This ordinary care should extend both to the host's "active" and "passive" negligence in cases where individuals are rightfully on the premises
49
of the host.
CONCLUSION

The trend of the courts in recent years has been to protect the welfare
of the individual in many areas of law. Unfortunately, this trend has not
been sufficiently extended to the social guest-host relationship. Although
the host must exercise ordinary care in carrying out his activities in the
presence of his guest, he is not held to the same standard of care
regarding the conditions of his premises. Where an invitee is assured that
the premises are in a reasonably safe condition, a social guest must take
the premises as he finds them.
The traditional view that the social guest is a licensee as a matter
of law must be discarded and the guest should be given the same legal
status as an invitee. Social intercourse affects almost every individual
in our society and some assurance should be given these individuals
that they will be protected from the host's negligent act. This security
can only be afforded by a new approach to the law. The invitation
test should be relied on by all the courts in determining a person's status
while on another's premises and extended to include the social guest
as an invitee. Only by taking this approach will the courts give full
protection to innocent individuals and shift the burden of responsibility
on the wrongdoers.
Jerry Franklin

47. Ibid.
48. Marquet v. La Duke, 96 Mich. 596, 55 N.W. 1006 (1893).
injury is caused by a dangerous animal strict liability is applied.)
49. 3 Cooley on Torts § 440 (4th ed. 1895).

(Generally, where

